The History of Europe's Energy Dependence on Russia
June 24, 2025 · Frisian News
Europe built its economy on cheap Russian gas and oil for decades, creating a dependency that politicians ignored until conflict forced a reckoning. Today, the continent scrambles to break free from the arrangement that made economic sense but cost it political leverage.
In 1968, the Soviet Union completed the first major pipeline bringing gas west to Prague and beyond. Western Europe welcomed the cheap fuel without asking hard questions about the strings attached. By the 1980s, West Germany bought a third of its gas from Moscow, while other nations followed suit. The logic seemed sound: Russia had resources, Europe had money and industry, and both sides gained. No one talked about what happened if the taps shut off.
The real bind tightened after the Cold War ended. Russia, desperate for hard currency, sold energy at rock-bottom prices. Eastern European states also fed the pipeline, turning Moscow into the continent's fuel pump. Companies and governments counted on this to stay cheap forever. Gazprom, Russia's state gas monopoly, became the linchpin of European energy policy without anyone admitting it. Cheap gas meant cheaper electricity, cheaper heating, cheaper everything. Voters liked lower bills. Politicians asked no questions.
When Ukraine resisted Russian pressure, Moscow turned off the gas in winter. Europe shrugged and found workarounds. When Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, Europe called it regrettable but kept buying. The pattern repeated, and Europe kept looking away. German politicians, especially, insisted that trade bonds would make Russia peaceful and that sanctions would harm Europe more than Russia. They were wrong on both counts, but by then the pipeline addiction ran too deep to break without pain.
The Ukraine invasion in 2022 shattered the illusion that buying Russian energy would keep the peace. Europe suddenly faced an impossible choice: freeze or cut itself off from Moscow. Nations scrambled for liquefied gas from America and others, at triple the price. Germany, which had shut down its nuclear plants and relied on Russian gas for stability, faced an energy crisis it created through decades of wishful thinking. The bill came due all at once.
Today Europe races to replace Russian energy with alternatives that cost more and arrive slower. LNG terminals spread across the continent. Solar and wind farms grow, but fill the gap they cannot. The lesson arrives too late: states should never let ideology and money cloud their judgment on vital resources. Europe paid for its dependency with higher bills, weaker industry, and lost influence. Some partnerships, it seems, simply cost too much.
Yn 1968 maakje de Sovjet-Unie de earste grutte pipelining ôf dy't gas nei it westen brocht, oant Praag en fierder. West-Europa naam it goedkeap brânstof wol oan sûnder djippe spearringen te stellen oer de betingsten dêran hâldend. Yn 'e tsientalen tachtich kocht West-Dútskland in tredde fan syn gas út Moskou, en oare lânnen folgen. De logika leek soled: Ruslân hie hjinnes, Europa hie jild en yndustry, en beide kanten profitearren. Niemannen sprutsen oer wat barre as de kraan wurde ticht sieten.
De werkelike greep fersterke nei it ein fan de Kuolde Oorlog. Ruslân, wanhopich om heard felje, ferkeapte enargye tsjin dumppriizen. Ek East-Europeeske steaten voaden de pipelining, wêrtroch Moskou de enargypepomp fan it kontinent waard. Bedriuwen en regeringen gienen der fan út dat dit altyd goedkeap bliuwe soe. Gazprom, Ruslands steatsgasmonopoly, waard de spil fan it Europeeske enargjebelied sûnder dat ienien it doarde ta te jaan. Goedkeap gas betsjutte goedkoper elektrisiteit, goedkoper ferherming, goedkeap alles. Kiazers wie it oan lytser rekken. Politisy stelden gjin spearringen.
Wannear Oekraïne him tsjin Ruske druk ferriet, draaide Moskou yn 'e winter it gas dicht. Europa helle syn skouders op en fûn útfiertjes. Doe Ruslân Georgië yn 2008 oanfoel, neame Europa it betreur it wie mar bleau keapjen. It patroan herhaalde, en Europa bleau fuort sjen. Dútske politisy fermaning atsje dat handelsbannen Ruslân tiisdlich meitsje soene en dat sanksjea Europa mear skatte soene as Ruslân. Se hie ûngeljok op beide punten, mar tsjin dy tiid wie de pipelijn-ôfhinklikheid te djip wurtele om sûnder pine te brekken.
De ynfal fan Oekraïne yn 2022 brak de ylluzy dat it keapjen fan Ruske enargye frede behâlde soe. Europa stie glyks foar in ûnmooglikheid: frysse of him fan Moskou ôfsnide. Naasjes grepen nei flúchber gas út Amerika en oars, tsjin it trijefâld fan 'e priis. Dútskland, dat syn kernplanten sliutten hie en op Rusk gas foar stabiliteit fertroude, stie foar in enargjekrisis dy't it sels troch desnialoang fan wunsfol thinken skapt hie. De rekken kaam allemol tagelyk.
Tsjin de dei racet Europa om Ruske enargje te ferfangen troch alternatieven dy't djoerder binne en langer komme. LNG-terminalen fersprieie him oer it kontinent. Sinne- en wynfarmen groeie, mar folje it gat net folslein. De les komt te let: steaten moarre ideology en jild har oarsjoch oer vitale hjinnes nea lit betrobele. Europa betelle foar syn ôfhinklikheid mei hegere rekken, swakkere yndustry en ferlern ynfloed. Guon partnerskipppen koste bliken gewoon tige folle.
Published June 24, 2025 · Frisian News · Ljouwert, Fryslân