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The History of Europe's Energy Dependence on Russia
Economy

The History of Europe's Energy Dependence on Russia

August 1, 2026 · Frisian News

After the Soviet Union collapsed, Western Europe gradually became dependent on Russian natural gas. The shift from Cold War caution to economic entanglement was not inevitable: it reflected the interests of politicians and energy executives who profited directly from the arrangement.

English

In 1990, Western Europe imported roughly 15% of its natural gas from the Soviet Union. By 2020, Germany alone bought 55% from Russia and Italy took 40%. This shift from Cold War caution to economic entanglement happened gradually, then suddenly.

The turning point came after 1991. As the Soviet Union collapsed, Russian energy became cheaper and more available. European governments and energy companies saw an opportunity: long-term contracts with Moscow offered stable prices and steady supply. The Nord Stream pipelines began as economic logic. Russia needed export revenue, Europe needed gas, and companies like Gazprom and their European partners stood to profit enormously from the arrangement. Over the following decades, this dependency deepened. Winter supply disruptions showed Europe the risks, yet the answer was never to reduce dependency, only to negotiate harder with Moscow.

Who benefited? Russian oligarchs and the Kremlin clearly. But so did European energy executives, pipeline builders, and the politicians who signed the contracts. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder left office in 2005 and joined boards linked to Gazprom. Angela Merkel, who grew up in East Germany and spoke Russian, accelerated Nord Stream's development even as Russian gas became a political tool during disputes with Ukraine. The incentives pointed one direction: more pipes, more gas, more profit for those at the negotiating table.

Europe had alternatives. Liquefied natural gas from the Middle East and Australia cost more upfront but offered supply diversity. Nuclear power was available and reliable. Renewable energy was developing. Yet each option faced obstacles: LNG required ports and investment, nuclear faced political resistance, renewables needed grid upgrades and time. Dependency on Russia required only signatures on contracts. It was cheaper, faster, and kept boardroom discussions simple. This was not an inevitable outcome of physics. It was a choice, made by people with specific interests.

The history of European energy dependency on Russia is not a story of bad planning or bad luck. It is a story of incentives. Those who could make decisions benefited directly from the outcome. Those who paid the cost came later.


Published August 1, 2026 · Frisian News